THX1138 at dakotacom.net
Sat Aug 12 18:49:29 CDT 2006
Scott Quinn wrote:
>> Supposedly, non-clocked logic can also offer greater security because
>> there's no clock signal for remote sensors to key on when trying to
>> sense what the CPU is doing. This seemed a little odd to me. Do
>> espionage types really try to sense what a processor is doing
>> remotely, based on the EM emissions from the chip?
> Don't know about processors, but Tempest had a proof of concept for intercepting I/O from kbd/video.
> (Anyone else remember Tempest? for a while they were selling big "tinfoil hat" type shields for monitors and then, suddenly,
> it went away.) Was that NSA that came up with the POC?
> P.S. - for the U.S. types - never would have thought it 15 years ago, but NSA now has official mousepads you can buy.
I think the *monitor* is the biggest (and easiest) "leak" to tap.
IIRC, in the UK they have mobile units that wander around trying
to see how many televisions each home has (?)
More information about the cctech